Why selling fire protection is a hard sell – Reason One

Reports of firefighter layoffs and station closings appear almost daily. Each case denotes another fire chief's failure to convince policy makers of the need for sufficient staffing. Why is selling fire protection such a "tough sell?" I see two principal reasons.

    1. The public's ignorance of an adequate fire department response.

     2. Fire chiefs' reliance upon output measures instead of results.

I had intended to discuss both reasons in a single post, but there is simply too much material. This post discusses the first reason, and I will follow up with a post on the second.

 Public ignorance of the need for multiple apparatus

Fire chiefs typically underestimate peoples' knowledge about how fire departments work. The general belief is that a fire truck pulls up at a fire, some firefighters rush in and the fire goes out. I learned about that perception when I was doing a station location study for my city. In the project office, we had mounted a large map of the 80 sq. mile area. We used it for attaching templates of first-due areas, second-due and so on. The city engineer assigned to the project sat in on many meetings where we analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of potential station sites – specifically a potential site's impact on second- and third-due company travel times.

Several months into the project, and after countless discussions emphasizing multi-unit response, the engineer stared at the map and blurted out, "Now I get it! You need more than one engine to handle a structure fire!" I had assumed that our lengthy discussions had made that clear, but he maintained the mindset of most civilians. He saw fire stations as just another neighborhood service. Building a new subdivision? Add a fire station along with the local grade school and other neighborhood services. Like practically all civilians, he did not understand the core element of effective manual fire suppression – performing several tasks either simultaneously or in a highly coordinated manner.

The following table lists the typical tasks required for an initial attack on a pre-flashover fire in a 1-family, single story detached home.

 

Task	Personnel	Company
Attack line	2	1st engine
Search/ rescue	2	Ladder company
	2	1st/2nd engine
Ventilation	2	2nd engine
Safety crew	2	As assigned
Pump operator	2	1st and 2 nd engine
Water supply	1	2nd engine
Command	1	BC

 I call those tasks "critical fireground tasks" because:

 

• They are all critical to the mission (saving lives and limiting property loss)
• They must be performed simultaneously or in a highly coordinated manner

Here are two examples of what I mean. As a crew prepares to enter the structure with the attack line, other firefighters must prepare to ventilate. If ventilation is performed too soon, the fire will greatly increase and be a bigger threat to any occupants who may be trapped. If performed too late, opening the attack line will blow fire and smoke back at the firefighters operating it. Simultaneous performance is critical to those tasks being effective and not unduly increasing the risks to the attack line crew. Water supply is an example of a highly coordinated task. The attack line is typically supplied by the booster tank on the first-due engine, but the water will run out if more is not made available within about three minutes. Failure to quickly establish a water supply will interrupt the fire attack and put the attack crew at even greater risk.

The number of critical fireground or mission-critical tasks will vary by jurisdiction. The tasks, firefighters and apparatus listed above may be sufficient for suburban homes with lots of space around them. In densely populated neighborhoods, additional tasks such as laddering, stretching lines and exposure protection can easily double the numbers of firefighters and apparatus that are needed to arrive closely after the first-due company..

The engineer's reaction prompted me to add a "Fire Protection 101"segment to my presentation to show why a house fire called for 13-15 firefighters arriving quickly. The educational part worked. Not only did the council quickly choose the next station site, but also decided to reopen a station that had been closed shortly before I came on board. The response area templates showed that the closure left much of the downtown without adequate second- and third-due companies.

The next table shows how staff levels, apparatus and travel times might increase as the structural fire risk increases. The greater the number of critical tasks, the higher the numbers. Again, the numbers will vary from community to community.

 

Risk level	Staff	Units	1st due	All due
Maximum	24 FF's 2 chiefs	4 engines 2 ladders	3.0	5.0
High	16 FF's 2 chiefs	3 engines 1 ladder	3.5	5.5
Moderate	12 FF's 1 chief	2 engines 1 ladder	4.0	6.0
Low	8 FF's 1 chief	1 engine 1 ladder	5.0	7.0
Minimum	4 FF	1 engine	6.0

 

Also keep in mind that the underlying assumption is that this applies to an initial response to a pre-flashover fire.

A note on the risk categories. My "Low" risk level includes non-structural and detached, uninhabited structures like outbuildings. The "Moderate" level covers detached 1- and 2-family homes and apartment buildings where all parts are accessible by pre-connected attack lines. Apartment building beyond that reach, of those needing heavier ground ladders (and thus more fighters to raise them), get bumped into the "High" level.

The "Maximum" risk level contains all structures where occupants will need assistance, such as nursing homes and hospitals. Buildings that are protected with automatic sprinklers get placed into the next lower risk category.

Next up – Reason number two why selling fire protection is a hard sell. Meanwhile, please share your thoughts!